D. H. Lawrence and the Truth of Literature by Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele & Sharrock, Peter
D. H. Lawrence and the truth of literature
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Peter Sharrock 
Abstract: 
Having established that what D. H. Lawrence means by truth is moral truth, we delineate his 
view of the novel as the best vehicle to communicate with the ‘subtle interrelatedness’ without 
which morality is merely moralism. We then examine Lawrence’s view that ‘art speech is the 
only truth’ and his distinction between the creating artist and the man, contrasting it with T. S. 
Eliot’s. This is done with the help of F. R. Leavis’s understanding of the artist as ‘at once 
personal and impersonal’ – that is as a great psychologist whose suppression of ego allows the 
deep and shared power of reality-soaked language to guide the creative flow. This is where art 
reclaims truth.   
D. H. Lawrence famously wrote that 'art-speech is the only truth'. If we are to give credibility
to these words, we must know what Lawrence means by 'truth'. Here is the passage in which
this expression occurs:
     Art-speech is the only truth. An artist is usually a damned liar, but 
his art, if it be art, will tell you the truth of his day. And that is all that 
matters. Away with eternal truth. Truth lives from day to day, and the 
marvellous Plato of yesterday is chiefly bosh today. […] Two blankly 
opposing morals, the artist's and the tale's. Never trust the artist. Trust 
the tale.1 
One thing is made clear by the passage: 'truth' here is not used in the sense of absolute truth, 
something that can never be falsified. This is close to Wittgenstein’s deflationary conception 
of truth, which is internally linked to what people say or claim is true. For Wittgenstein, what 
it means to call a statement 'true' is that we currently judge it true, and so may later revise that 
claim. But nor is Lawrence talking about scientific truth; for even if, as Popper has made clear, 
science progresses through the falsification of its truths, it is not in the business of telling us 
what Lawrence calls the truth of our day; rather, it only wants to nail things down: 
     Philosophy, religion, science, they are all of them busy nailing things 
down, to get a stable equilibrium. Religion with its nailed down One 
God, who says Thou shalt, Thou shan't, and hammers home every time; 
philosophy, with its fixed ideas; science with its 'laws': they, all of them, 
want to nail us on to some tree or other.  
   But the novel, no. The novel is the highest example of subtle inter-
relatedness that man has discovered. Everything is true in its own time, 
place, circumstance, and untrue outside of its own place, time 
circumstance. If you try to nail anything down, in the novel, either it 
kills the novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail.2  
If, for Lawrence, artistic truth is not absolute, nor is it mere correspondence with reality. 
The mere mirroring of reality would coincide with Plato's degrading image of the artist holding 
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up a mirror to nature and passively capturing its reflections. Plato's notion of mimesis or 
imitation as literal copying, devoid of creativity, probably contributed to Nietzsche's view of 
him as 'the greatest enemy of art Europe has yet produced'3. It took Aristotle, as ever countering 
his master, to imbue the notion of mimesis with meaning, making it what Musil calls an 
'enlightened mimetism'. For Aristotle, artistic truth is not mere factual accuracy: art says 
something about what it presents. It does this by drawing our attention to some aspects of reality 
rather than to others; thereby giving us what Wittgenstein would call a 'perspicuous 
presentation' of reality4. In her artistic presentation of reality, the artist enables us to see that 
which, though in front of our eyes, remains unnoticed. It is this structured representation – a 
representation through an artistic medium – that affects us in such a way that an exceptional 
kind of understanding, one rarely experienced without the mediation of literature, takes place. 
So that, as Amelie Rorty puts it: 'While there is sorrow, grief, loss, pain in life, there is tragedy 
only when the actions and events that compose a life are organized into a story, a structured 
representation of that life'5. It is in the tale – that is, in a structured representation of life – that 
truth about life shows itself.  
 It is important to note that Lawrence equates truth, as literature dispenses it, with 
morality. This is visible in his warning: 'Two blankly opposing morals, the artist's and the tale's. 
Never trust the artist. Trust the tale.'  The tale's moral is its truth; the truth we must trust. For it 
is not a truth we can prove, nail down. Moral truth is not demonstrable; it is, however, 
'monstrable', showable. The tale shows, or presents, or enacts moral truth. How it does this is 
what we'll now explore. 
 
A balancing act 
 
Lawrentian morality would fall within the very broad range of concerns associated with the 
Aristotelian question of 'how to live'. Lawrence's summary answer to that question would be: 
'in true relatedness'. For him, ‘Morality is that delicate, for ever trembling and changing balance 
between me and my circumambient universe, which precedes and accompanies a true 
relatedness’ (PhI, p. 528). 
 Morality is a balancing act. It is not achieved by juggling gross dichotomies of 
good/bad; right/wrong or one-size-fits-all principles, but by relating individuals to each other 
and to their world. There is no question for Lawrence that morality can be poised on anything 
but life, which is by definition relational. Morality is trembling and delicate precisely because 
poised on the relatedness inherent in all life. This is where, for Lawrence, the novel becomes 
incomparable: 'of all the art forms, the novel most of all demands the trembling and oscillating 
of the balance' (PhI, p. 529); 'The novel is the highest form of human expression so far attained' 
precisely '[b]ecause it is so incapable of the absolute'6, for 'only in the novel are all things given 
full play, or at least, they may be given full play' (PhI, pp. 537-38). A novel which does not 
deploy the vital, dynamic, interrelatedness whereby all things are given full play, balanced 
against each other, is not art. As Lawrence writes: 'In a novel, everything is relative to 
everything else, if that novel is art at all' (PhII, p. 416). And so, like morality, the novel admits 
of no absolutes. They are, it seems, made for each other.  
 'Morality in the novel is the trembling instability of the balance. When the novelist puts 
his thumb in the scale, to pull down the balance to his own predilection, that is immorality' 
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(PhI, p. 528). What Lawrence means by 'immorality' is more clearly rendered by the term 
'moralism' which, unlike 'immorality', includes the didactic, prescriptive stance he repeatedly 
condemns. If the novel does not tremble, it is because the thumb of didactic purpose, the 
authorial voice, is pinning it down. To prevent this, other voices must be given full play. A 
novel that does not do this falls prey to the 'stable equilibrium' of the treatise. Lawrence is clear: 
morality in the novel resides in the trembling instability of the balance; its dynamic 
interrelatedness. This amounts to saying that the novel's morality consists – not in its depiction 
of particular relations – but in its very deployment of interrelatedness; in its bringing into play, 
into situation or circumstance, varying and often opposing values, senses, needs, desires, 
feelings. Though it is particulars that are played off against one another in particular 
circumstances, the focus is not on these but on the fact that they are played off; on the 
relatedness inherent in life, on the context-dependence of truth. As Lawrence writes in 
'Morality and the Novel': 'It is the relation itself which is the quick and central clue to life, not 
the man or the woman'; and again: 'If a novel reveals true and vivid relationships, it is a moral 
work, no matter what the relationships may consist in' (PhI, p. 531 original italics; p. 530).  
 Yet here Lawrence seems to be taking back with one hand what he is giving with the 
other: on one hand, all we want from the novel is that it present or convey relatedness; on the 
other, the relatedness has to be 'true and vivid'. But what of the relatedness, in Anna Karenina, 
between Anna and Karenin? It is not true and vivid; and yet it is essential to the novel's 
morality. Or does Lawrence mean, not that the relationship should itself be true and vivid, but 
that it should be truly and vividly conveyed? Well, it is that; but we think Lawrence would 
insist on there being at least one true and vivid relationship between the characters themselves 
– that is a 'real' or sincere relationship, albeit not unproblematic – in order for the novel to have 
what F. R. Leavis calls that 'certain symmetry of negative and positive'7 which would make it 
a moral work. The relationship between Anna and Vronsky would fall into that category. A 
novel would need at least one such 'true and vivid' relationship, according to Lawrence, for it 
to be a moral work. 
 There is, however, no such relationship in Madame Bovary, whose heroine experiences 
only failed relationships and ends up committing suicide. And yet, pace Lawrence, we would 
say it is a profoundly moral novel – moral in the sense that it penetrates the question of how to 
live. That it does so mostly by showing us how not to live is probably why Lawrence regarded 
Flaubert, undeservedly we think, as standing 'away from life as from a leprosy' (PhI, p. 312), 
and 'all the modern stuff since Flaubert' failing to be the 'great kick at misery' that tragedy ought 
really to be8.  
 Emma Bovary's ennui may not be of the same calibre as Baudelaire's spleen, but it 
belongs to the same family: the family of feelings that are directly connected to existence; here, 
in the form of a mal de vivre, or an ennui de vivre. Flaubert gives us a perspicuous presentation 
of the occurrence of ennui in the life of a superficial bourgeois woman, incapable of 
Baudelairian reflection. But he, Flaubert, is not incapable of reflection; nor should he be 
diagnosed with a 'radical sickness of the spirit' – Leavis's diagnosis (DHL, p. 27) – because he 
depicts a spirit radically poisoned – poisoned with ennui. Leavis sees a 'defeat of intelligence' 
in Flaubert's 'restricting himself so much by the limitations of [Emma's] consciousness (which 
is 'really too small an affair')' – the same 'inner contradiction' he sees in T. S. Eliot between the 
'slow meticulous labour of calculating judgement that clearly went to the doing; and… the sick 
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poverty, the triviality, and, finally, the nothingness, of the done – the human and spiritual 
nullity' (DHL, pp. 26-27). 
 We find two things wrong here with Leavis's judgment: he conflates the spirit of the 
author with that of his main character9; and he imposes the life-defeating nature of the character 
on the whole novel. Madame Bovary is not 'art-defeating because life-defeating', for it is not 
life-defeating at all, but life-presenting. It makes the most acutely sensitive 'presentment' of 
ennui, not in the life of a world-weary Faust or a splenetic poet, but in the life of a bourgeois 
woman. And why should that more mundane and common portrayal of a mal de vivre – which, 
remember, was the mal du siècle – not interest us, not make us more psychologically sensitive 
to and aware of our human condition? Great literature has magnified our understanding of 
ambition, hate, jealousy, envy, perversity – so why not ennui? Yes, these are life-defeating 
feelings, but in better understanding their poisonous infection of a human life, we better 
understand human life. Can we not say about Madame Bovary what Leavis says about Anna 
Karenina: 'the book gives the compelling constatation of a truth about human life'10? And so 
what we would call a life-affirming novel is not only one which would 'present' the defeat of a 
life-defeating attitude such as Emma's ennui, but one which would truly and vividly present the 
attitude. 
 Even if we were to agree with Leavis that only affirmative art can be considered great, 
it would be a mistake to think that all affirmative art is written in the affirmative mode; or, 
indeed, that it should provide the answers to the questions it poses. Certainly, we should not 
judge a literary work according to whether or not it has solved the problems it analyses. 
Madame Bovary does not attain such resolution and, as Leavis concedes, nor does Women in 
Love: 'The un-Flaubertian spirit of Lawrence's work, while producing its characteristic vital 
perfections11, has of course its own tendencies to imperfection' (DHL, p. 28). One of these 
imperfections is the uncertainty we are left in at the end of Women in Love, which shows its 
author, writes Leavis: 'defeated by the difficulty of life: he hasn't solved the problems of 
civilization that he analyses' (DHL, p. 29). Should this really be seen as an imperfection in the 
work? Is this really what a novelist should do – solve the problems of civilization? This from 
Leavis who elsewhere affirms that literature is 'exploratory creation'12; 'an exploratory effort 




Leavis shares Lawrence's view of the novel's inherent, vital and organic capacity for 'subtle 
interrelatedness'13 as insuring that significance result from a 'balancing act', not from an 
absolute or subjective or single perspective. This reduces the possibilities of being seduced by 
the wrong voice. So, for instance, only a moralist or a stubbornly inattentive reader of Anna 
Karenina could maintain that Anna is nothing but an egotistical adulteress. For the voice in the 
novel: the 19th century societal, Christian, voice – which makes her out as that, and which also 
infects other voices, including Anna's herself – is intricately and variously related to and 
contradicted by other voices and by the dramatized description – the psychologically subtle 
description supported by imagery, symbolism etc. – of Anna's and other pertinent characters' 
feelings and actions. For, in order to be trustworthy, narration and dialogue must find subtle 
relatedness – that is, subtle reverberation and corroboration – in a diversity of nonverbal foils.  
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 However, in their very attempts to spell out the novel's resources against authorial 
moralism, both Lawrence and Leavis betray their own tendentiousness: a demand that 
sententiousness, or conservatism or some moralistic or life-defeating attitude or other be 
condemned and finally drowned out in the novel by the novel. It is probably this absence of a 
clear opposition to what they see as a life-defeating attitude that fuels their objection to 
Madame Bovary. And what of Lawrence's affirmation that 'the great relationship, for humanity, 
will always be the relation between man and woman. The relation between man and man, 
woman and woman, parent and child, will always be subsidiary' (PhI, p. 531). The obvious 
counterexample which comes to mind is the relation between Gerald and Birkin in Women in 
Love.     
  In Ethics, Theory and the Novel14, literary theorist David Parker offers a less dogmatic 
reading of Lawrence's 'dynamic interrelatedness' – one which does not see the novel as a 
successful suppression of the moralist stance, but as an equitable forum for both moral sides. 
As Charles Taylor argues, there is a necessary tension between two different sorts of 
incommensurable and only sometimes reconcilable moral demands: 'we are and cannot but be 
on both sides of the great intramural moral disputes' of our culture15. For Parker, 'this means 
that the novelist only apparently resolves the tension by attempting to suppress one sort of 
moral claim in the interests of the other. The drive to resolve all conflicts in this way is nothing 
but a will-to-master-narrative' (ETN, p. 57). For true balance and impersonality, the art must 
give full recognition to the necessity of both sorts of moral demand, writes Parker: 
 
      The real conflict in Anna Karenina is between a Judeo-Christian moral 
perspective that centres on the recognition of human continuities, and a 
Romantic-expressivist one that centres on the ethical demands flowing from the 
recognition of human uniqueness and difference. … it is the realisation of the 
incommensurability and mutual antagonism of these two necessary perspectives 
that underlies our judgment that this [perennial] retelling of the story about 
adultery has the profoundest moral interest and relevance for us. … both the 
Judeo-Christian and the Roman-expressivist perspectives are essential ones for 
modern selves constituted by these very traditions. Neither can be abandoned or 
subsumed by the other in an imaginative work, except at the price of the art itself 
either becoming perceptibly judgmental or evasive, failing to recognise the 
ethical legitimacy of certain unavoidable human needs and desires. (ETN, p. 70) 
 
Ethical binary oppositions must be given full play in the novel in order, not to celebrate one at 
the expense of the other, but to acknowledge their necessary co-existence, however conflictual. 
Only then has ethical impersonality a chance. But, despite insisting on removing the thumb 
from the balance, Lawrence is, as Parker suggests, 'characteristically drawn to believe that the 
dilemma can be answered – simply by the woman following out the Romantic demands of self-
realisation' (ETN, p. 73). Laudable as this might seem, it is an answer where there ought to be 
only be an exploratory question; and it is an answer that is characteristic of Lawrence rather 
than contextual. Moreover, it is an answer that Flaubert, true to the nature of Emma Bovary's 
situation, cannot give. 
 
Art-speech is the only truth 
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But if Lawrence's predisposition to feel-good endings makes the balance of his novels not quite 
trembling with instability, the task he sets the novel is admirable. The master-narrative is but 
one voice amongst others – also subjected to the tale's constitutive self-critical apparatus – 
which precludes it from being a privileged, didactic, reference point. It expresses one of several 
moral possibilities that are, in the novel, tested against one another in what must remain, for 
both writer and reader, an exploration of moral possibilities. It is in the coherence of the whole 
that the tale's voice, the moral insight which has consistently and irresistibly evolved into a 
'true and vital relation' – can be unerringly recognized: ‘[Novels] in their wholeness … affect 
the whole man alive, which is the man himself, beyond any part of him. They set the whole 
tree trembling with a new access of life: they do not just stimulate growth in one direction’ 
(PhI, p. 536; my italics). The tale's voice that we must trust in despite of the artist is that of the 
novel as a whole, the novel in its wholeness. It is, as Parker puts it, the 'countervailing force or 
will or imperative in the work of art itself (that is, the impersonal 'tale' rather than the teller), 
which, if it is strong enough, is able to get up and walk away with the artist's nail' (ETN, pp. 
61-62)?  
But for all of his mistrust of the artist, Lawrence does not see him only as 'a damned 
liar', not to be trusted; he also speaks of the 'deep, great artist'. For, in fact, Lawrence's distrust 
of the artist is a distrust of the artist as a man; the artist qua artist, qua teller is to be trusted. 
This is clear in the essay on Herman Melville:  
   
   The artist was so much greater than the man. The man is rather a 
tiresome New Englander of the ethical mystical-transcendentalist sort: 
Emerson, Longfellow, Hawthorne, etc. ... But he was a deep, great 
artist, even if he was rather a sententious man. He was a real American 
in that he always felt his audience in front of him. But when he ceases 
to be American, when he forgets his audience, and gives us his sheer 
apprehension of the world, then he is wonderful, his book commands a 
stillness in the soul, an awe.16  
 
'In his "human" self, Melville is almost dead', continues Lawrence, but when the 'self' gives 
way to a 'sheer apprehension of the world' untrammelled by an overly cerebral consciousness, 
we have the 'deep, great artist'; the artist who is able to quieten his conscious aim, his 
metaphysics, so that the novel can have its voice. And so, writes Parker: 
 
     There is a desirable sort of unconsciousness in writing … whereby 
the work itself seems to take over, following the directions it itself must 
take. Fidelity to this sort of unconsciousness, preparedness to pursue 
the ties of artistic purpose and 'sympathetic consciousness' into 'places 
unknown' constitutes the supreme moral imperative for the creator of 
any literary text. (ETN, p. 62) 
 
 Lawrence goes to great lengths, in Fantasia of the Unconscious, Psychoanalysis and 
the Unconscious and many of his other works, to find the source of this artistic depth. He 
glimpses it in the right balance 'between the artist's mind and his intuition and instinct' (PhI, p. 
573; original emphasis); but his calls for 'sentient non-knowledge' (PhI, p. 479) to counteract 
the tyranny of mind take an unnecessarily metaphysical turn. So we prefer leaving Lawrence 
for a moment and turning to Leavis's less metaphysical rendering of Lawrence on this matter – 
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that is, of how the tale, as the locus of reconciliation between the artist's conscious self and his 
passional inspiration, gives us truth. We might readily accept that giving all things fair play 
goes a long way towards purveying moral truth, but how is this artist – this teller of a tale – 
better equipped than anyone – be it a philosopher, judge or scientist – to give all things fair 
play – or to write the tale that will?  
 
Leavis: the artist as great psychologist 
 
Although Lawrence insisted on the vital aspect of intelligence in the human quest for moral 
truth, his most ardent efforts went toward the recognition and celebration of the cognitive value 
of the emotional, sensual and instinctive. This emphasis was necessary because he found the 
scale had already been too long and too heavily thumbed on the side of mind-knowledge; so 
that redressing it meant leaning more insistently on the neglected side. But Lawrence's crusade 
against the tyranny of mind must not be mistaken for one that would give full sway to the body. 
If he firmly believed that the 'mind as author and director of life is anathema'17 his was an 
insurrection against the tyranny, not against the mind. What Lawrence sought was balance. 
However, his insistence that what was needed was a recalibration of mind-knowledge, and not 
its exclusion – 'we must know, if only in order to learn how not to know. … At last, knowledge 
must be put into its true place in the living activity of man. And we must know deeply, in order 
even to do that' (FU, p. 76) – was drowned out by his more enflamed and radical exhortations 
– often rendered more radical through decontextualisation – to give oneself up 'to quivering 
uncertainty, to sentient non-knowledge' (PhI, p. 425). T. S. Eliot's pronouncement of what he 
deemed to be Lawrence's 'incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking'18 is but one of the 
feebler misinterpretations of Lawrence's extensive attempt to precisely revise 'what we 
ordinarily call thinking'. Like Nietzsche, Lawrence has often been misread and misused, but 
genius survives – it survives not only its own ideology, but also that of others.  
 In setting about the task of saving Lawrence from such myopic visions as Eliot's, Leavis 
had to tip the scale back from Lawrence's necessary but overemphatic insistence on intuition. 
It was 'thought' that Leavis brought back to the fore. But not that unidimensional thought 
against which Lawrence struggled; rather, the 'thought' which resulted from that struggle. The 
thought that he had imbued with 'blood-knowledge, instinct, intuition, all the vast vital flux of 
knowing that goes on in the dark, antecedent to the mind'; that thought 'with its own blood of 
emotion and instinct running in it like the fire in a fire opal' (SCAL, p. 91). To deny that that is 
thought; to restrict the use of 'thought' to a rational activity devoid of emotion and sensation 
would be to revert to the very dualism that Lawrence was, and we still are, attempting to 
dissolve. Thought is not a reductively cerebral activity – 'Thought is a man in his wholeness 
wholly attending'19. It is this kind of thought that Leavis attributes to the great creative writer, 
and which makes the great creative writer 'a great psychologist' – as indeed he finds Lawrence 
to be20: ‘What we need to get recognition for is that major creative writers are concerned with 
thought, and such recognition entails the realization that the thought is of an essential kind’21. 
 Inspired by Lawrence's revision of the nature of thought and intelligence, Leavis re-
establishes the intellectual status of the creative writer and argues that literature is a form of 
thought – intuited thought. This, however, does not to dispense the creative writer from 
possessing the more common form of intelligence which Eliot thought Lawrence lacked, 
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thereby charging him with ignorance (ASG, pp. 58-59)22: intelligence as the combined fruit of 
education, 'ratiocinative powers' and experience. Leavis corrects Eliot by noting 'Lawrence's 
indebtedness to the specialist books he had read, and read critically', remarking that 'the 
extraordinary power Lawrence had of assimilating the abstruse books of distinguished 
professionals in various fields was an essential aspect of his genius'23. He insists on the 
importance of education and reading for Lawrence’s creative genius (as for all major writers, 
including such 'visionaries' as Blake). Creative intelligence is not a spontaneous eruption; it 
must be rooted in education, analysis and experience. Only in this informed and exposed soil 
can it cultivate the receptiveness, sensitivity and understanding without which it will be 
incapable of what, for Leavis, are necessary components of a creative intelligence: 'sympathetic 
consciousness' and 'profound psychological insight' (DHL, pp. 259, 22). The great novelist is, 
for Leavis, 'a great psychologist'. This is not to say she is a cerebral delver into the cerebral. 
Leavis is quick to stress: 'I impose an anti-positivist, or an anti-pseudo-scientific, sense on the 
word 'psychology' (CAP, p. 19). And so: ‘Lawrence the great novelist and critic is the great 
psychologist’ (TWC, 32); ‘the endless resource of [Lawrence's] art is profound psychological 
insight … the insight he brings from life, from his experience and observation’24 (DHL, p. 125; 
p. 138). This is the case for all great novelists, like George Eliot, whose ‘radically reverent 
attitude towards life, a profound seriousness of the kind that is a first condition of any real 
intelligence, and … interest in human nature … made her a great psychologist’25 (GT, p. 14). 
 The artist's 'supra-normally sensitive' (DHL, p. 259) perception gives him 'access to that 
comprehensive human experience without which he [would be] incapacitated for the imagining 
and producing of a great creative work' (CAP, p. 206). This extraordinary sensitivity to life 
stems from a 'richer human interest' (DHL, p. 259), and is inseparable from an attentiveness to 
language, both to the common language and to 'the fullest use of language' – that of literature: 
'the education of [Blake's] powers of expression that went with his addiction to Shakespeare 
was, inseparably an education of his power to perceive, to recognize and to imagine'. Indeed, 
Blake 'had two starting-points: one in traditional popular culture and the other in Shakespeare. 
… they are not altogether distinct from one another, they are not really separable' (CAP, pp. 
143; 13; 11).  
 Leavis is clear: the writer's interest in words, language, speech is an interest in life; and 
the cultivation of his interest in language is a cultivation of his powers of observation, 
perception, empathy – and thus, of understanding. Moreover, first-hand living, observation and 
perception are not, in the case of the creative writer, mere extraneous advantages that can 
enhance her art: there is a 'supreme need for the novelist, the novelist as artist, to be intelligent 
about life' and 'a continuity from the inherent creativity of perception to the creativity, trained 
and conscious, of the artist' (CAP, pp. 114; 18). Intuition or inspiration are not enough: the 
artist's perception or sensitivity must be trained and conscious.  
 However, for all of the man's education, experience, perception and analysis, we must 
be clear that it is the artist – not the man – who is the great psychologist. The artist's thought 
– not the man's thought – is inseparable from his art. Here, Leavis echoes Lawrence – 'the 
creative product of the artist' does not have its source in ego and will – but in 'something other', 
a 'deep-lying source' (TWC, pp. 72-3) – but he also clarifies the source of that deep-lying 
source: it is language. And of course we know that language, for Leavis (as it was for 
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Wittgenstein), is not a mere vehicle for thought; not a means of expressing thought but the sine 
qua non manifestation of thought:  
 
     Without the English language waiting quick and ready for him, Lawrence 
couldn't have communicated his thought: that is obvious enough. But it is also 
the case that he couldn't have thought it. English as he found it was a product 
of an immemorial sui generis collaboration on the part of its speakers and 
writers. It is alive with promptings and potentialities, and the great creative 
writer shows his genius in the way he responds. (TWC, p. 26) 
 
   Like that of all great creative writers, his creativity manifests itself in 
new shades of suggestion, new felicities of force, got out of the common 
language – in (we feel) an inspired way, rather than by calculating intention. 
(TWC, p. 67) 
 
 There is no thought (other than in a derived sense of 'thought') that is not linguistic. So 
that to go to the 'common language' for inspiration is to go to the common source of thought – 
what Leavis also called 'the third realm' and / or 'the living principle': that 'apprehended totality 
of what, as registered in the language, has been won or established in immemorial human living' 
(LP, p. 68). It is in the act of creation, in her intense and unimpeded head-to-head with 
language, her strenuous delving into its resources and potency for expression, that the artist 
produces the intuitive thought that would not be possible outside this confrontation. It is the 
artist and the language brought together in a creative enterprise that produces the creative work. 
In this 'interplay – as Leavis puts it – between the living language and the creativity of 
individual genius' (LP, p. 49), the writer finds not only the source of creativity but also what 
Bernard Harrison calls 'the limits of authorial licence':  
 
     … the need to put down some words on a blank page, marks not the point at 
which the writer enters into the full play of authorial licence, but, paradoxically, 
the point at which authorial licence begins to encounter limits. Neither language 
nor the vast web of practices which supply roles, and hence meanings, to its 
words are, after all, either the property or the inventions of the author. They are 
public property: the framework of a culture and a world – or, better, system of 
worlds – which he found ready-made when he entered it at birth, and which will 
long outlast him. Plot, genre, local colour, choice of characters and 
relationships, all these are in the unimpeded gift of the author. But ultimately 
characters must be made to speak, words must be deployed upon a page. It is 
then that the going begins to get sticky; then that human reality begins to reclaim 
her own.26  
 
 This is why Leavis speaks of 'the impersonality of genius' (GT, p. 32); and says 'great 
art is necessarily impersonal'; well, 'at once personal and impersonal' (CAP, pp. 147; 32).  
Although Leavis sees the quality of genius as distinctive and intensely individual, his view of 
language as 'collaborative creativity' (LP, p. 36) is what makes the work of art 'the creative 
product of something other than ego and will' (TWC, pp. 72-3). Here, Leavis makes non-
metaphysical sense of Lawrence's crusade against the ego. Because of the reality-soaked nature 
of language, the artist's thought, though of necessity grounded in the personal, transcends it – 
in the tale, through the tale – to become greater than the man. Through the tale, the personal 
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reaches the impersonal or objective – what Lawrence calls truth. It is the art that gives the 
thought its force, its truth. 
 Lawrence calls for a suppression of 'the human self' to allow the artistic apprehension 
to emerge. This is a variant of the Romantic notion of poet as a passive Aeolian harp through 
which the wind of inspiration blows: 'Not I, but the wind that blows through me'27. In the same 
vein, Leavis speaks of 'the claim that is genuinely a disclaimer' that every significant artist can 
make of the creative works he produces: 'Though I call them mine, I know that they are not 
mine' (LP, p. 44: TWC, p. 86). However, impersonality does not trump personality to the extent 
that we lose sight of the author altogether. This is not the post-modernist 'death of the author'. 
It is difficult, but necessary, to boldly underline the difference between the 'escape from 
personality' advocated by Eliot and the suppression of ego and will advocated by Lawrence 
and Leavis. Eliot's call for the artist's 'continual surrender of himself … to something which is 
more valuable', making his progress 'a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality' is, as he says himself, 'a process of depersonalization' in which 'art may be said to 
approach the condition of science'28. His separation between 'the man who suffers and the mind 
which creates'29 is a call for the suppression of personal emotion 'in order to express feelings 
which are not … emotions at all' (ibid. 57-58). This is indeed a depersonalisation whose goal 
is to make art more objective in the way of science. It does not resemble the impersonality 
acknowledged by Lawrence and Leavis whose goal is to draw from the 'deep-lying source' the 
truth; 'the truth that concerns us' (SCAL, p. 8). 
 What is it about Tolstoy that makes him the genius he is – a genius so different from 
Dostoevsky whose language, country and epoch he shares? Genius is individual because it 
resides in an individual – a historically- and socially-situated individual – but an individual 
who is more attuned to the wind that blows through him than self-focused. That wind may have 
its specific time and geography but – as Gadamer, pace Lawrence, reminds us – art is timeless 
and beyond geography. Something happens when an artist creates – even if in another age or 
geography – that transcends time and space and speaks to us directly. This, Lawrence the artist 
also understood, and voices it through Birkin in Women in Love, with respect to the African 
statuette about which Birkin thinks: 'There are centuries and hundreds of centuries of 
development in a straight line, behind that carving', and then says to Gerald: 'It conveys a 
complete truth. It contains the whole truth of that state, whatever you feel about it'30. 'Art-
speech is the only truth' – be it literature or any other art, Lawrence is clear: 'The work of art is 
only the truth about the real world, that's all' (WL, p. 485). 
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